about supporting such an inferentialist account, the best plan would be to show in detail that it has the resources to determine the meanings of hundreds of thousands of words and billions of expressions. Unfortunately, that project is still far beyond us. In the meantime, a sensible research strategy for controlling some of the complexity starts by defining solvable toy problems. Once these are understood, the lessons learned can be applied to more complex cases. The question of how and whether the deductive roles of the logical symbols can determine their meanings is a good example of such a toy problem. Here it is less plausible to think that relations to perception and action are essential to the meanings of the logical symbols. If there is any hope for a theory that presumes that meaning can be defined by logical relations alone, the best place to look would be in a study of the meanings of the logical connectives. One of the purposes of this book is to explore that question in detail and to report on the lessons learned. The realm of logic is especially well chosen since here it is possible to give mathematical demonstrations that answer such questions as whether connective meaning is or is not underdetermined by a set of rules. So the question on the table will be whether the alien anthropologists, knowing what will be revealed in this book, can determine what our logical symbols mean from a study of the rules we use.
An important conclusion established here is that the answers depend on decisions about the format of the rules, and decisions about how to define what rules express about connective meaning. As different choices are made, the view that the patterns of inference set up by the rules of deduction are sufficient for determining connective meaning are in some cases vindicated and in others undermined. By noting the strategies that can be employed to resolve problems of meaning underdetermination for the logical connectives, new insights may be obtained about how one might resolve problems of meaning underdetermination for language in general. Here is an example of a ND system for a propositional logic with → andã s its only connectives, using horizontal notation that makes apparent the idea that ND rules are defined over arguments.
Proof-theoretic and model-theoretic inferentialism
For ease of comparison with multiple conclusion sequent systems to be presented shortly, it will be assumed that H is a possibly infinite set of wffs.
The notation H, A is used as shorthand for H ∪ {A}, and we sometimes omit set braces so that A, B abbreviates {A, B}. In the case of ND systems, the symbol / is assumed to be in the object language, and a rule takes one from an argument or arguments to a new argument. The symbol ⊢ is used in the metalanguage to indicate the provability of an argument in a system being discussed. Therefore H ⊢ C abbreviates the claim that the object language argument H / C has a proof in that system. (See Hacking (1979, p. 292) , who adopts this convention.)
Natural deduction systems will play an important role in this book because of their interesting expressive powers. The results developed for them will help vindicate inferentialist intuitions that natural deduction rules have a special role to play in defining connective meaning.
The third format for presenting rules of logic is multiple conclusion sequent notation. A (multiple conclusion) sequent H / G is a generalization of the notion of an argument H / C, where the conclusion G is now taken to be a set of wffs. In this book, we will always use sequent to refer to such a multiple conclusion sequent. The sequent H / G is understood to express the 1.3 Three rule formats 9
